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1  Overview 
In a recent provocative article, Kamstra et al. (2000) found that the average Friday-to-
Monday stock return on daylight saving weekends was 200 to 500 percent larger than 
the average negative return for other weekends (the so-called ‘weekend-effect’ market 
anomaly) and thereby associated with a one-day loss of US$31 billion on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ markets alone. Kamstra’s et al. (2000) findings appeared to hold 
not only in the United States and Canada, where the transition to and from daylight 
saving is broadly similar, but also in the United Kingdom, whose patterns differ from 
that in North America, and to a lesser extent in Germany. On this basis, Kamstra et al. 
(2000, p. 1010) suggested that if daylight saving was associated with “…the sort of 
impact investigated here, an obvious policy implication is to do away with the time 
change altogether”.  
The essence of Kamstra’s et al. (2000) argument is that the ‘daylight saving effect’ 
is linked with sleep desynchronosis associated with the change in the circadian rhythm 
and its (negative) impact on sleep patterns. Every Spring at 2:00 a.m. on the first 
Sunday in April US clocks are moved forward one hour, and the following Fall at 2:00 
a.m. on the last Sunday in October clocks are moved back one hour. As with jet lag, 
where changes in sleep patterns are thought to persist up to five days for each one-hour 
time zone crossed (Waterhouse et al. 1997), the movement to daylight saving time 
(DST) also compresses the day, while the movement from daylight saving stretches it, 
and this also impacts upon sleep patterns.  
If, and as hypothesised by Kamstra et al. (2000, p. 1006), “…sleep desynchronosis 
causes market participants to suffer greater anxiety about a given situation, ceteris 
paribus, they may prefer safer investments and shun risk in trades during the trading 
day following such a disturbance in their sleep patterns…this could push down stock 
prices following daylight saving shifts when the desynchronosis is systematic”. In fact, 
the argument that shifts to and from daylight saving has an impact upon actual 
behaviour already has parallels elsewhere with Bick and Hannah (1986) and Shapiro et 
al. (1990) studying the impact of DST on psychiatric presentation, and Coren (1996a, 
1996b) Lambe and Cummings (2000), Varughese and Allen (2001) and Sullivan and 
Flannagan (2002) examining its role in traffic and pedestrian accidents. 
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All the same, there are a number of complications associated with Kamstra’s et al. 
(2000) purported daylight saving effect, which may not arise in non-financial market 
contexts. To start with, the daylight saving effects exists in parallel with the oft-
examined weekend effect, for which a number of competing hypotheses have already 
been put forward and tested (see, for instance, Agrawal and Ikenberry 1994, Chang et 
al. 1993, 1998 and Wang and Erickson, 997). The weekend effect has already been 
linked to lags in the payment and cheque clearing settlements, to midweek time 
pressures on individuals, the tendency for financial advice to be given after Monday 
strategy-setting meetings, and to the larger percentage of purchases (sales) on Fridays 
(Mondays) at dealer ask (bid) prices (Kamstra et al. 2000). It may then be possible that 
the sleep desynchronosis associated with daylight saving weekends is just an alternative 
manifestation of this more usual market anomaly. For example, Pinegar (2002, p. 1256) 
countered that “the change in sleeping patterns from weekdays to weekends occurs with 
much greater frequency and is very plausibly more pronounced than the change in 
sleeping patterns between daylight-saving and non-daylight saving weekend. Thus 
sleep desynchronosis may contribute to the so-called ‘day-of-the-week’ effect on non-
daylight saving Mondays also”.  
Another problem is that daylight saving transition weekends are by nature limited in 
number, and these may be juxtaposed with outliers. Once again, Pinegar (2002) 
questioned Kamstra’s et al. (2000) conclusions on the basis that in the last eighty years 
three of the largest percentage declines in the S&P 500 took place after a fall daylight-
saving time change (most recently Monday 26 October 1987). In response, Kamstra et 
al. (2002, p. 1263) countered, “…while we do not believe that daylight-saving-time 
changes cause market crashes, we do believe that daylight-saving-time changes affect 
the degree of market fluctuations…we speculate that severe downturns are more likely 
following daylight-saving weekends, and we argue that the data support this 
contention” (original emphasis). Lastly, Pinegar (2000) also argues that the apparent 
corroboration offered by Kamstra’s et al. (2000) inclusion of Canada, Germany and the 
United Kingdom in their analysis may be an illusion associated with the normal 
influence on them by the US market, and that such international evidence should then 
be treated more cautiously.  
The purpose of the present article is to add to this small but intriguing body of work 
the results of an analysis of the Australian equity market. To the author’s knowledge 
this is the first of its kind in Australia, and adds significantly to the nascent literature 
concerning the economic benefits and costs of daylight saving. The article itself is 
divided into four main areas. Section 2 discusses the starting and ending dates of DST 
in Australia since 1979/80. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology and data 
collection employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results. The article ends with 
a brief conclusion. 
2  Daylight Saving in Australia 
Two dates are relevant for the implementation of DST in Australia: (i) a Sunday a.m. 
starting date, usually in late October, and (ii) a Sunday a.m. ending date, normally in 
late March in the following year. However, one complication that does exist in 
Australia is that not all states and territories currently use DST, and of those that do the 
 TABLE 1  
IMPLEMENTATION DATES OF DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME WITHIN AUSTRALIA, 1979/80 – 2002/03 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT Total 
Year Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End 
1979-80 28-Oct 2-Mar 28-Oct 2-Mar – – 28-Oct 2-Mar – – 28-Oct 2-Mar 28-Oct 2-Mar 1 1 
1980-81 26-Oct 1-Mar 26-Oct 1-Mar – – 26-Oct 1-Mar – – 26-Oct 1-Mar 26-Oct 1-Mar 1 3 
1981-82 25-Oct 4-Apr 25-Oct 7-Mar – – 25-Oct 7-Mar – – 25-Oct 28-Mar 25-Oct 7-Mar 1 2 
1982-83 31-Oct 6-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar – – 31-Oct 6-Mar – – 31-Oct 27-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar 1 1 
1983-84 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar – – 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar 1 1 
1984-85 28-Oct 3-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar – – 28-Oct 3-Mar – – 28-Oct 3-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar 1 1 
1985-86 27-Oct 16-Mar 27-Oct 16-Mar – – 27-Oct 16-Mar – – 27-Oct 2-Mar 27-Oct 16-Mar 1 2 
1986-87 19-Oct 15-Mar 19-Oct 15-Mar – – 19-Oct 15-Mar – – 19-Oct 15-Mar 19-Oct 15-Mar 1 1 
1987-88 25-Oct 20-Mar 25-Oct 20-Mar – – 25-Oct 20-Mar – – 25-Oct 20-Mar 25-Oct 20-Mar 1 1 
1988-89 30-Oct 19-Mar 30-Oct 19-Mar – – 30-Oct 19-Mar – – 30-Oct 19-Mar 30-Oct 19-Mar 1 1 
1989-90 29-Oct 4-Mar 29-Oct 18-Mar 29-Oct 4-Mar 29-Oct 18-Mar – – 29-Oct 18-Mar 29-Oct 4-Mar 1 2 
1990-91 28-Oct 17-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar 28-Oct 17-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar – – 28-Oct 3-Mar 28-Oct 17-Mar 1 2 
1991-92 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 22-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 27-Oct 27-Oct 1-Mar 1 3 
1992-93 25-Oct 7-Mar 25-Oct 7-Mar – – 25-Oct 7-Mar – – 4-Oct 7-Mar 25-Oct 7-Mar 2 2 
1993-94 31-Oct 6-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar – – 31-Oct 20-Mar – – 31-Oct 27-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar 2 3 
1994-95 30-Oct 5-Mar 30-Oct 26-Mar – – 30-Oct 26-Mar – – 2-Oct 26-Mar 30-Oct 5-Mar 2 3 
1995-96 29-Oct 31-Mar 29-Oct 31-Mar – – 29-Oct 31-Mar – – 1-Oct 31-Mar 29-Oct 31-Mar 2 1 
1996-97 27-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar – – 27-Oct 30-Mar – – 6-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar 2 1 
1997-98 26-Oct 29-Mar 26-Oct 29-Mar – – 26-Oct 29-Mar – – 5-Oct 29-Mar 26-Oct 29-Mar 2 1 
1998-99 25-Oct 28-Mar 25-Oct 28-Mar – – 25-Oct 28-Mar – – 4-Oct 28-Mar 25-Oct 28-Mar 2 1 
1999-00 31-Oct 26-Mar 31-Oct 26-Mar – – 31-Oct 26-Mar – – 3-Oct 26-Mar 31-Oct 26-Mar 2 1 
2000-01 27-Aug 25-Mar 27-Aug 25-Mar – – 29-Oct 25-Mar – – 27-Aug 25-Mar 27-Aug 25-Mar 2 1 
2001-02 28-Oct 31-Mar 28-Oct 31-Mar – – 28-Oct 31-Mar – – 7-Oct 31-Mar 28-Oct 31-Mar 2 1 
2002-03 27-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar – – 27-Oct 30-Mar – – 6-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar 2 1 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology (2003). Notes: NSW – New South Wales, VIC – Victoria, QLD – Queensland, SA – South Australia, WA –
Western Australia, TAS – Tasmania, ACT – Australian Capital Territory. The Northern Territory has never implemented Daylight Saving Time. Start –
starting date of Daylight Saving Time, end – ending date of Daylight Saving Time. In all cases listed the change to Daylight Saving Time took place at 0200 
hours Local Standard Time on the day concerned, and from Daylight Saving Time to Local Standard Time at 0300 hours. All transitions to and from DST are 
on Sundays. Total is the number of different start and end dates across the states and territories in each year.  
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timing and adherence to the usual starting and ending dates has varied over the sample 
period. As shown in Table 1, of Australia’s six states and two territories only New 
South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), South Australia (SA), Tasmania (TAS) and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have implemented DST annually since 1979/80, 
while Queensland (QLD) and Western Australia (WA) adopted DST spasmodically, 
from 1989/90 to 1991/92 and in 1983/84 and 1991/92, respectively. The Northern 
Territory (not shown) has never used DST. In order to reflect these differences in the 
current analysis, two sets of starting dates and three sets of ending dates are identified.  
The first set of starting dates is where the most populous states of NSW and VIC 
both shift to DST at the same time. These account for 24 cases in the 24 years in the 
sample and on most occasions include many of the remaining states and territories. The 
second set is when a state or territory other than NSW or VIC commences DST on 
some other date. This represents 11 cases in 24 years. The other set of dates is the DST 
ending dates and these comprise three categories: (i) occasions when NSW and VIC 
shifted from DST at the same times (19 cases), (ii) dates when NSW and VIC moved 
out of DST at different times (4 cases in each respect) and (iii) dates when a state or 
territory other than NSW and VIC shifted out of DST at a different time to NSW and 
VIC (8 cases).  As before, at least some other states and territories may also have 
moved out of DST at these times. Accordingly, in the twenty-four year sample there 
have been thirty-five weekends in Australia where DST started at 2:00 a.m. on Sunday 
and thirty-five weekends where DST ended on Sunday at 3:00 a.m.  
3 Research Method and Data 
To test for the economic effect of daylight saving time change we look at the first 
trading day following the transition to or from DST. The data employed in the study are 
market returns drawn from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period 2 
January 1980 to 5 May 2003. Both the All Ordinaries Price and Accumulation 
(including dividends and capitalisation changes) Indices are used. Following Kamstra et 
al. (2000, 2002) and Pinegar (2002) a series of daily raw returns are calculated of which 
three categories are identified. These are: (i) a weekend return calculated from the 
Friday and Monday closing prices for weekends that do not include a DST starting or 
ending Sunday, (ii) a DST starting and ending weekend return calculated using the 
Friday and Monday closing prices for weekends including a DST starting or ending 
Sunday, and (iii) other days being those other than DST and non-DST weekends. The 
DST starting and ending weekends are further categorised according to the different 
sets of starting and ending dates discussed above. 
The basic hypothesis examined in this analysis is that the change to DST impacts 
upon sleep patterns in such a way that the daily returns for the next trading day 
following such a transition will differ from other days. This is because the starting of 
DST is associated with a loss of one hour during the day while the movement from 
DST adds an hour. Further, since the transition to (and from) DST has the effect of 
compressing (stretching) the day, and thereby potentially having a negative (positive) 
effect on sleep patterns, the returns for the next trading day will be less (more) than 
other day returns. Finally, since the ‘daylight saving effect’ exists in parallel to the 
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typical ‘weekend effect’ the magnitude of the change to (and from) DST will be larger 
(smaller) than the expected (negative) weekend effect.  
Two approaches are used to test these hypotheses. The first involves a descriptive 
analysis of the mean returns and tests of equality of these means using parametric 
analysis following Kamstra et al. (2000). As a rule, the mean return for the start of 
daylight saving is expected to be negative and less than the (negative) return for other 
weekends, while the mean return for the end of daylight saving can be either negative or 
positive, though the mean return should be higher than that for daylight saving or other 
weekends. The second is a regression-based approach where daily market returns are 
regressed against variables indicating the presence of daylight saving and weekend 
effects: 
tt3t2t10t ENDSTTWKDRTN εββββ ++++=       (1) 
where RTNt is the daily Monday to Friday market return at time t, STT is a dummy 
variable that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST started, END a 
dummy variable that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST ended,  
WKD  a dummy variable that equals one for all other Mondays, βi are coefficients to be 
estimated and ε is the error term. This approach follows that used by Pinegar (2002). 
Following the hypotheses presented, the signs on the coefficients for WKD and STT are 
both expected to be negative, though the magnitude of STT is hypothesised to be larger 
than WKD, while the hypothesised sign on the coefficient for END is positive. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (with trend and intercept) reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root and we conclude that both the price (test statistic = -30.1679, 
p-value = 0.0000) and accumulation (test statistic = -30.1415, p-value = 0.0000) return 
series are stationary and suitable for regression-based analysis. 
4  Empirical Findings 
Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for daily market returns. These 
are categorised according to the daylight saving and weekend effects hypothesised: 
namely, (i) non-DST starting or ending weekends, (ii) DST starting weekends common 
to NSW and VIC, (iii) DST ending weekends common to NSW and VIC, (iv) DST 
ending weekends for NSW but not VIC, (v) DST ending weekends for VIC but not 
NSW, (vi) DST starting weekends for other states and territories that were not shared 
by NSW and/or VIC, (vii) DST ending weekends for other states and territories that that 
were not shared by NSW and/or VIC, and (viii) all other days. Price returns are 
depicted in the upper portion of Table 1, while accumulation returns (including 
dividends and capitalisation changes) are presented in the lower portion. Sample means, 
trimmed means, medians, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, skewness and 
kurtosis are reported. Tests of equality of means are also included, comparing the mean 
returns for weekend and DST-weekend returns to other day returns and for other day 
and DST-weekend returns to weekend returns. 
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TABLE 2  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF DAILY RETURN DATA 
  Number Mean Trimmed Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Other Days  
t-tests 
Weekend  
t-tests 
Other Days 4870 0.00039 0.00049 0.00036 0.00927 -0.24995 0.06254 -4.35098 113.37800 – – -0.707 (0.240) 
Weekend 1148 0.00017 0.00036 0.00000 0.00965 -0.08096 0.06850 -0.63299 9.17159 0.707 (0.240) – – 
NSW & VIC Start 24 -0.00204 0.00018 -0.00011 0.01483 -0.06555 0.01318 -3.61138 15.68260 1.277 (0.100) 1.098 (0.136) 
NSW & Vic End 19 0.00182 0.00140 0.00176 0.00787 -0.00935 0.02049 0.68897 0.24247 -0.672 (0.251) -0.740 (0.230) 
NSW End 4 0.00313 0.00333 0.00492 0.00649 -0.00568 0.00835 -1.09243 0.00336 -0.591 (0.277) -0.612 (0.270) 
VIC End 4 0.00481 0.00512 0.00760 0.00730 -0.00586 0.00989 -1.72021 2.92337 -0.955 (0.170) -0.961 (0.169) 
Other State Start 11 -0.00317 -0.00318 -0.00546 0.00836 -0.01657 0.01049 0.01102 -0.91861 1.272 (0.100) 1.144 (0.127) 
A
l
l
 
O
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d
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Other State End 8 -0.00534 -0.00499 -0.00243 0.00813 -0.01985 0.00296 -0.85440 -0.46222 1.745 (0.041) 1.610 (0.054) 
Other Days 4870 0.00051 0.00061 0.00048 0.00924 -0.24986 0.06420 -4.38696 114.92855 – – 0.005 (0.498) 
Weekend 1148 0.00051 0.00065 0.00000 0.00986 -0.08007 0.07067 -0.46735 8.72164 -0.005 (0.498) – – 
NSW and VIC Start 24 -0.00267 -0.00042 -0.00005 0.01591 -0.06368 0.01323 -2.85455 9.66039 0.976 (0.170) 1.537 (0.063) 
NSW and Vic End 19 0.00213 0.00158 0.00205 0.00806 -0.00788 0.02189 0.78203 0.42161 -0.763 (0.223) -0.712 (0.239) 
NSW End 4 0.00336 0.00358 0.00533 0.00658 -0.00565 0.00843 -1.15718 0.26894 -0.618 (0.269) -0.578 (0.282) 
VIC End 4 0.00514 0.00545 0.00790 0.00742 -0.00562 0.01040 -1.64534 2.59180 -1.004 (0.158) -0.940 (0.174) 
Other State Start 11 -0.00328 -0.00331 -0.00545 0.00824 -0.01658 0.01048 0.03255 -0.79439 1.359 (0.087) 1.271 (0.100) A
l
l
 
O
r
d
i
n
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s
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n
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e
x
 
Other State End 8 -0.00506 -0.00470 -0.00216 0.00797 -0.01958 0.00298 -0.91135 -0.23699 1.704 (0.045) 1.594 (0.056) 
Notes:  DST – daylight saving time, Number – Number of observations in category, NSW & VIC Start (End) - starting (ending) DST weekend mean return where NSW 
and Victoria start (end) DST on the same date, NSW (VIC) End – ending DST weekend mean return where NSW (Victoria) end DST on different dates, Other State 
Start (End) – starting (ending) DST weekend mean return for states other than NSW and Victoria where different to NSW & VIC start (end), Weekend – all non-DST 
start/end weekend mean returns, Other Days – all days other than DST and non-DST weekend mean returns. Five percent trimmed mean. Critical values at the .05 level 
for skewness and kurtosis are: Other Days (0.035, 0.070), Weekend (0.072, 0.145), NSW & VIC Start (0.500, 1.000), NSW & Vic End (0.562, 1.124), NSW End 
(1.225, 2.449), VIC End (1.225, 2.449), Other State Start (0.739, 1.477), Other State End (0.866, 1.732), respectively. Levene’s test for equality of variances determines 
whether the t-statistics and p-values for equality of means assume equal or unequal variances. Figures in brackets are p-values, Other Days t-tests – one-sided tests of 
equality of means to Other Days mean returns, Weekend t-tests – one-sided tests of equality of means to Weekend mean returns. Sample period 2 January 1980 to 5 May 
2003.  
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4.1 Parametric Tests of Return Differences for Daylight Saving Weekends  
At first impression, there appears to be some evidence of both the weekend and daylight 
saving effects in the Australian stock market. In terms of price returns, the mean 
weekend return (0.00017) is less that of other days (0.00039) while the mean DST 
starting returns are negative for both NSW and VIC (-0.00204) and other states (-
0.00317) and generally positive for the DST ending returns (NSW and VIC 0.00182, 
NSW 0.00313, VIC 0.00481 and other states -0.00534). These mean price returns are 
broadly comparable to mean accumulation returns with the exception that the starting 
DST returns for NSW are no longer negative.  
However, the t-tests comparing these mean returns to other days and weekends 
indicate that few of these differences are statistically significant. The starting DST 
mean price return is significantly less than other days at the .10 level suggesting that the 
mean return for Mondays following the introduction of DST in NSW and VIC is six 
times less than other days, while the return for other states starting DST is about 
thirteen times less. But these mean differences are no longer significant when specified 
in terms of returns on the accumulation index. In that instance, only the mean return for 
other states starting and ending DST are significant (at the .10 and .05 levels, 
respectively) suggesting mean accumulation returns are between six and nine times less 
for Mondays following the starting and ending of DST in states other than NSW and 
VIC where such dates differ. 
Significance tests for the differences of means as compared to weekend returns offer 
a similar picture. For the price index, only the mean returns for other states ending DST 
is significant at a conventional level but does not conform to the hypothesised direction, 
whereas in the accumulation index the start and end of DST in states and dates other 
than NSW and VIC are also significant at the .10 level. In sum, the tests of differences 
in means show that price returns for Mondays following the introduction of DST are 
less than the returns for others days but only where DST has started on the same day in 
both NSW and VIC or where another state or territory has introduced DST on a day that 
differs from NSW and VIC. For accumulation returns, the mean return is less for 
Mondays following both the start or ending of DST in a state other than NSW and VIC. 
Lastly, the mean return for DST starting weekends in accumulation terms and DST 
ending weekends in price and accumulation returns is significantly less than other 
weekend returns, but only for DST starting and ending dates outside of NSW and/or 
VIC. 
4.2 Regression-based Analysis of the Daylight Saving Effect  
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed in (1) are 
presented in Table 3. The upper portion of Table 3 is where the dependent variable is 
specified as daily Monday to Friday price returns, while the lower portion details the 
results of regressions where daily accumulation returns comprise the dependent 
variable. The independent variables in all instances are dummy variables for DST 
starting (STT) and ending (END) and other weekends (WKD). However, in the first 
regression for price and accumulation returns, the dummy variables are identified for all 
DST starting and ending dates, while in the second regression in each case these are 
DST starting and ending dates in NSW and/or VIC only. Three different standard 
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TABLE 3  
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS FROM DAYLIGHT SAVING REGRESSION MODELS 
 
   Least Squares White Newey-West 
 Model Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value Std. error t-statistic p-value Std. error t-statistic p-value 
CNS 0.0004 0.0001 2.8806 0.0040 0.0001 2.9087 0.0036 0.0001 2.6197 0.0088 
WKD -0.0002 0.0003 -0.7053 0.4807 0.0003 -0.6893 0.4907 0.0003 -0.6980 0.4852 
STT  -0.0028 0.0016 -1.7536 0.0795 0.0022 -1.2802 0.2005 0.0021 -1.3084 0.1908 
A
l
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
 
&
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
END 0.0003 0.0016 0.1813 0.8561 0.0014 0.2104 0.8334 0.0014 0.2012 0.8405 
CNS 0.0004 0.0001 2.7564 0.0059 0.0001 2.7836 0.0054 0.0001 2.5046 0.0123 
WKD -0.0002 0.0003 -0.6489 0.5164 0.0003 -0.6342 0.5260 0.0003 -0.6420 0.5209 
STT  -0.0024 0.0019 -1.2600 0.2077 0.0030 -0.8130 0.4162 0.0029 -0.8269 0.4083 
A
l
l
 
O
r
d
i
n
a
r
i
e
s
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
N
S
W
 
&
 
V
i
c
t
o
r
i
a
 
o
n
l
y
 
END 0.0021 0.0018 1.1549 0.2482 0.0014 1.4806 0.1388 0.0014 1.4772 0.1397 
CNS 0.0005 0.0001 3.7616 0.0002 0.0001 3.8203 0.0001 0.0001 3.4455 0.0006 
WKD 0.0000 0.0003 0.0050 0.9960 0.0003 0.0048 0.9961 0.0003 0.0049 0.9961 
STT -0.0034 0.0016 -2.1140 0.0346 0.0023 -1.4579 0.1449 0.0023 -1.4866 0.1372 
A
l
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
 
&
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
END 0.0005 0.0016 0.2911 0.7710 0.0014 0.3352 0.7375 0.0014 0.3209 0.7483 
CNS 0.0005 0.0001 3.6375 0.0003 0.0001 3.6947 0.0002 0.0001 3.3301 0.0009 
WKD 0.0000 0.0003 0.0623 0.9503 0.0003 0.0600 0.9521 0.0003 0.0609 0.9515 
STT -0.0032 0.0019 -1.6425 0.1005 0.0032 -0.9911 0.3217 0.0031 -1.0060 0.3144 A
l
l
 
O
r
d
i
n
a
r
i
e
s
 
A
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
n
d
e
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N
S
W
 
&
 
V
i
c
t
o
r
i
a
 
o
n
l
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END 0.0023 0.0018 1.2524 0.2105 0.0014 1.5758 0.1151 0.0014 1.5729 0.1158 
Notes: Dependent variable is daily stock returns on price and accumulation index 2 January 1980 to 5 May 2003. CNS – constant, WKD – non-DST 
start/end weekend dummy variable, STT – DST starting weekend dummy variable, END – DST ending weekend dummy variable, All States and 
Territories refers to models including all Australian DST starting and ending weekend dummy variables, NSW and Victoria only model refers to 
models including only NSW/Victoria DST starting and ending weekend dummy variables. Least squares – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values 
from ordinary least squares, White – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values employing corrections for heteroskedasticity of unknown form 
following White (1980), Newey-West – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values employing corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form following Newey and West (1987). 
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errors, t-statistics and p-values are calculated and presented in Table 3 for each of the 
four regression models. These are standard errors, t-statistics and p-values obtained by: 
(i) ordinary least squares (Least Squares), (ii) those employing corrections for 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form (White), and (iii) those incorporating corrections 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Newey-West). 
Once again, the signs on the estimated coefficients appear to offer prima facie 
support for the posited daylight saving effect. The signs on WKD and STT are always 
negative, with the magnitude of STT being larger, suggesting the presence 
simultaneously of both the weekend and daylight saving effect market anomalies. That 
is, the weekend effect is associated with a lower mean return than others days and the 
start of DST is linked with a larger negative effect as compared to other weekends. The 
sign on END is likewise consistence with the hypothesis that mean returns following 
the end of DST are positive, or at least higher, than the mean returns of DST starting 
and non-starting weekends. However, only in the case of DST starting weekends are the 
least squares estimates of market returns significant.  
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier and White’s heteroskedasticity tests are used 
to test for higher order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the least squares 
residuals, respectively. To start with, for both the price (test statistic = 25.9878, p-value 
= 0.0000) and accumulation (test statistic = 26.0726, p-value = 0.0000) returns least 
squares regressions, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected and we may 
conclude the presence of higher order serial correlation in the residuals. Then the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals fails to be rejected 
where price (test statistic = 0.1309, p-value = 0.9417) and accumulation (test statistic = 
0.2282, p-value = 0.8768) returns are specified as the dependent variable and we 
conclude the presence of heteroskedasticity in the least squares residuals.   
After corrections are made for heteroskedasticity (White) and heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Newey-West) none of the parameters in Table 1 are significant at any 
conventional level, irrespective of whether market returns are specified in price or 
accumulation terms, or whether the transition weekends are in all Australian states and 
territories or only NSW and VIC. On average, weekend returns that follow the start or 
end of daylight saving time are not abnormally high or low when compared to other 
weekends or other days of the week. Furthermore, there is no significant difference 
between weekend returns as defined (Friday-Monday) and daily returns Monday-
Tuesday, Tuesday-Wednesday, Wednesday-Thursday and Thursday-Friday.      
5  Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
The present study employs parametric analysis to test for the ‘daylight saving effect’ 
market anomaly in the Australian stock market. At first there would appear to be some 
empirical evidence to support the conjecture that the transition to (and from) daylight 
saving, as variously defined, is associated with a lower (higher) mean market return 
than either other weekends or other days. However, after adjustments are made for 
heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation, neither the transition to daylight saving nor 
the movement from daylight saving is associated with returns that are statistically 
significantly different from other days, let alone other weekends. These results lie 
counter to the US, UK and Canadian findings of Kamstra et al. (2000, 2002) but are 
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similar to the results of Pinegar (2002, p. 1255) who also found that the hypothesis that 
“…mean weekend returns are significantly lower following changes in daylight-saving 
vis-à-vis other weekends is not robust”. Indeed, there would also appear to be no 
evidence in this study to support even the well-investigated hypotheses underlying the 
weekend effect market anomaly. Daylight saving in Australia may be opposed on a 
number of policy grounds, but it would appear that adverse affects on capital markets 
should not be one of them. 
Of course, the sleep desynchronosis linked with the transition to and from daylight 
saving may have a role to play in financial markets that has not been investigated here. 
All of these indicate future directions for research. One possibility follows the 
suggestion of Pinegar (2002) that changes in sleep patterns may amplify the impact of 
negative news and that the true impact of daylight saving, or indeed any other source of 
sleep disturbance, may be measured by how daylight saving transition weekends affect 
the magnitude of positive and/or negative changes, rather than positive and/or negative 
changes themselves.  
Another possibility is that the adjustment process to daylight saving may be slower 
than that hypothesised, and that the full effect of sleep desynchronosis may be felt at 
less significance over several days rather than the twenty-four hours employed here. 
Lambe and Cummings (2000), for example, point out that the adjustment process in 
daylight saving may be longer than jet lag because of the absence of new external 
reference points to the change in time. Finally, it may well be the case that the daylight 
saving effect, like many other market anomalies, is felt more keenly in small companies 
than large. Since this study uses market-weighted stock indices as against price or 
equal-weighted market indices or small cap sector indices, such differences may well be 
obscured.   
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